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Abstract
This paper illustrates the practice of operations research. The
problem: design the experimental competitive bidding mechanism to be
used in a multi-million dollar demonstration and evaluation of com-
petitive bidding as a method for pricing clinical laboratory services
provided to Medicare patients. If the demonstration proceeds as
initially conceived, this competitive mechanism v;ill price about 250
million dollars worth of services.
Our model of this problem, and the proposed solution developed in
stages. This paper presents and discusses the objectives and constraints
of the model. Vie also recap the main stages through v;hich the final
solution developed. An example illustrates the final proposal.
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Introduction:
The practice of operations research consists of two steps. First,
one models the problem that needs attention. Then, one develops a
solution to the problem as modelled. Of course, when examined in the
context of the actual problem, the solution to the model may suggest
changes that need to be made to the model. So, the practice of
operations research typically turns into an iterated process of model
building and model solving. But ultimately, one ends up with a model,
and with a solution to the model.
This paper illustrates the practice of operations research. Given
the problem of designing the competitive pricing mechanism to be used
in a multi-million dollar demonstration and evaluation of competitive
bidding as a method for pricing clinical laboratory services, we started
by defining the goals, objectives, political realities, and constraints
as we saw them. Then we searched for a solution. An examination of
the solution often suggested changes to how we viewed the problem, and
another round of modelling and solving ensued. In the end, we had a
model of the problem, and a solution that seems to have evolved in
several stages; subsequent sections of this paper present the final
model, the multi-stage development of the final solution, and the final
solution itself.
Note that this paper illustrates the process of operations research
rather than the application of any specific optimization techniques.
Indeed, our problem appears much harder to pin down and define than
typical textbook examples. And, the resulting model fell outside of
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any neat class of models for which tidy solution techniques already
exist. Instead, we wallowed through an iterative process of combining
many individuals' different understandings of the client's goals, of
the health care industry and the practice of medicine, and of the theory
of auctions and competitive bidding to come up with _a practical, but
not necessarily optimal, solution to a problem that we still only
imperfectly understand.
Operations reseearch cannot be practiced in a vacuum. Someone nust
first recognize that a problem exists. The problem must be considered
to be of enough practical importance to warrant attention. And, there
must be some hope that giving attention to the problem will improve
matters. Our problem satisified all three of these prerequisites.
In particular, the annual cost of the Medicare and Medicaid programs
now exceeds 89 billion dollars (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1986, p.
100). For example, Medicare annually pays over two billion dollars
for clinical laboratory services alone (Health Care Financing
Administration, 1984). And, the costs of health care continue to grov/
at an alarming rate, a rate well in excess of general inflation. The
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA)—the organization that
administers the Medicare and Medicaid programs—has an obvious problem:
what can it do about the spiralling cost of health care?
HCFA currently pays for services on the basis of a fee schedule
which is based upon amounts previously billed for the same services.
This fee schedule approach has an obvious inflationary incentive: a
lab can increase its future payment rate by billing the government at
-3-
prices which exceed the current fee schedule. In designing the Medicare
program, Congress wanted Medicare to pay prevailing market prices for
health care services. This was an unrealistic approach because Medicare
was such a large program that it inevitably created a vast increase in
demand and a consequent rise in health care prices. However, the
commitment to pay prevailing prices is the reason for the existence of
the fee schedule methodology. In recognition of the actual inflationary
incentives, Congress has periodically stepped in and made ad hoc
adjustments to the fee schedule methodology to slow down the inflation-
ary process. As a consequence, the fee schedule is now calculated by
a rather complicated formula (it is now set at 60 percent of the 7 5
percentile of all bills submitted for a particular test) which is sub-
ject to frequent political adjustment. Competitive bidding is supposed
to help break the inflationary spiral by giving providers an incentive
to bid lower prices (in order to win) rather than higher prices (in
order to raise the fee schedule), and thereby result in prices
indicative of actual costs.
In an auction—for example, in a sealed bid auction of a contract
—
the competition among bidders counteracts any commonality of interests
in establishing a high price. True, a bidder may bid more than his
actual expected cost of performing the contract conditional on winning;
indeed he must do so if he expects to make a profit. However, each
bidder must now tradeoff increases in his expected profit conditional
on winning against decreases in his probability of winning; the lower
he bids, the better a bidder's chances of winning a contract. This
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competition among those who hold the cost information limits the amount
by which the winner's bid exceeds his expected costs of performing the
contract. And, the bid-taker doesn't need to know anything about the
bidders' actual costs.
These characteristics of competitive bidding recommend it as a
method for pricing clinical laboratory services. Indeed, many Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) already use competitive bidding to
price the clinical laboratory services that they purchase. These HMOs
perceive a substantial financial savings, and the prices negotiated by
these organizations appear to be much less than Medicare's (Anderson,
1986). Others' experiences and experiments with competitive bidding
(Paris (1976), Mennemeyer (1984), and Scherer (1964)) also suggest
that HCFA should consider competitive bidding to price the services
that it purchases.
In an attempt to gain experience with competitive bidding, HCFA in
1983 awarded a contract to the Center for Health Policy Studies (CHPS)
to design a system of competitive bidding for clinical laboratory
services. CHPS developed a model which allowed for exclusive multiple
winning bidders. This meant that several bidders would be selected as
winners and all other bidders would be excluded from doing further work
for Medicare during the period (one to two years) until the next bidding
opportunity. One strength of this approach was that it solved a thorny
problem of how HCFA could assure that the winning bids would not be so
low that they might encourage a deterioration in the quality of
laboratory tests. This was viewed as an important consideration because
the Air Force had experienced serious quality problems a few years
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earlier when it had awarded an exclusive contract for pap smear testing
to a single laboratory. Under the CHPS design, physicians would be
free to shift their business among several laboratories. This meant
that the system would be self policing in the sense that each laboratory
would have to continually satisfy its physician-customers that their
patients were receiving accurate tests. No additional regulatory
machinery would have to be created to monitor quality beyond a
licensure and periodic inspection program that was already in place.
The CHPS design, however, set off an uproar in the laboratory
industry because it meant that losing bidders would be excluded from
being able to do business with Medicare. This was viewed as a calamity
because Medicare represented about 30 percent of a typical lab's
business. Even more important was Che perception that physicians wanted
to deal with one laboratory to perform all of their work; it was widely
believed that a physician would not split his business between a
laboratory eligible for Medicare work and one that was ineligible.
Exclusion from being able to serve Medicare was viewed as a death
sentence to losing laboratories. This perception was heightened by the
fact that the CHPS design called for bids on everyone of some 2,000
tests for which Medicare reimbursed. The industry perceived this
bidding format as favoring large commercial laboratories which are
capable of performing such a wide range of tests. In practice, most
small to medium size laboratories confine their testing to 60 to 100
of the most common tests and they send out the remaining relatively
rare tests to either the large laboratories or to small highly special-
ized laboratories. The CHPS design actually allowed smaller
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laboratories to arrange for referral work, but this fact was over-
looked by much of the industry. It was also widely believed by the
industry that the CHPS design would encourage predatory pricing by the
larger laboratories. That is, the laboratories would submit artifi-
cially low bids and subsequently come to enjoy a near monopoly after
the demise of their smaller competitors.
The industry's perceptions were viewed by HCFA and by CHPS as
bordering on the hysterical. They expected that a two tiered market
would develop. Winning laboratories would charge physicians a premium
price (for non-Medicare tests) and offer the convenience of testing for
both Medicare and other business; losing laboratories would counter
with a lower price to induce the physician to send some of his business
to the losing laboratory. In any case, CHPS and HCFA believed that the
only way to induce bidders to offer a price approaching their actual
cost was to confront (high) bidders with the alternative of losing
Medicare's business entirely.
HCFA and CHPS were also skeptical of the predatory pricing argument
because entry costs into the industry are not particularly high; they
felt it would be very difficult for a predato to maintain a hold on the
market unless it kept its profits at a level near that of perfect
competition.
In 1985 HCFA awarded a second contract to Abt Associates to review
the CHPS design, revise it as necessary, and then conduct and evaluate
a demonstration of competitive bidding in five sites using the revised
model. The model which was developed under the Abt contract is
described in this paper. Its major innovations were that it allowed
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losing bidders to continue to be reimbursed by Medicare (on a dis-
counted price basis) and it restricted the number of tests which would
be subject to bidding. These features were viewed by the industry as
being much less threatening to the business survival of losing bidders.
In spite of these changes, the industry conducted a massive lobbying
campaign to get Congress to stop HCFA from conducting such a demonstra-
tion. Our interpretation of these efforts is that the new model pre-
served the basic incentive of any auction; namely that of delivering
the goods at a price near the level of perfect competition. Delays,
first of six months and then again of another year, were eventually
attached to Congressional budget resolutions. However, these efforts
at delay plus the development of the "nonexclusive" model described in
this paper have both helped to shift the burden of proof from HCFA to
the industry to show why grave harm (to anything other than some
laboratory's profits) might result from the revised model. At this
writing, the industry is under a requirement to present a reasonable
counter plan.
The Model:
The model presented in this section evolved through an iterative
process. In particular, given any particular model, we tried to develop
a solution to the model as currently stated. Then, sorting through
this solution's good and bad characteristics, and trying to discover
what about the model allowed or forced these characteristics, suggested
aspects of the model that needed modifying, and aspects of the model
that should be retained if possible. For example, starting with the
simplistic goal of reducing HCFA's costs as much as possible, taken
-8-
quite literally, resulted in the obviously unacceptable "solution" of
eliminating the Medicare programs, laboratory benefits entirely, and
ultimately led to constraints of maintaining the current quality and
scope of service, and of not simply shifting the costs to others.
Simply put, the objective became to establish the lowest cost at which
the clinical laboratory services currently paid for by Medicare could
be obtained.
Notice that we say "the lowest cost at which" rather than "the
lowest cost to HCFA at which;" reducing HCFA's costs by simply pushing
the costs onto someone else would be a false economy. For example,
HCFA's costs would be reduced dramatically if the Government passed a
law stating that in order for a laboratory to retain its certification
and be allowed to provide clinical laboratory services, the laboratory
must provide at least as much service for free to Medicare patients
as it performs for a fee for non-Medicare patients. This wouldn't
reduce the cost of the services, but simply reassigns the costs.
Although the example may be extreme (and perhaps a denial of Constitu-
tional due process), it does illustrate the phenomenon of simply shift-
ing the costs to some other party, something that we wish to avoid.
Note also the phrase "services currently paid for;" reducing the
cost of Medicare services by reducing the quality or scope of services
would also be a false economy. For example, saving HCFA money by
lessening the accuracy of tests would be unacceptable. This gave rise
to the constraint that the package of services provided under the
experimental pricing mechanism be as good or better than that currently
provided.
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This constraint of maintaining the current level of service proved
much harder to pin down than that, for instance, of not shifting costs.
For example, imagine a laboratory somehow managing to be paid for
thousands of dollars worth of tests that it did not perform, and then
distributing some of the ill-gotten gains to the doctors who send their
laboratory work to this laboratory. If this extra income permits a
doctor to take a more relaxing vacation than otherwise, and then treat
Medicare patients slightly more effectively when on duty, should HCFA
want to continue to pay the laboratory for the bogus work? Our answer:
"Only if there were no other, less expensive way to make an offsetting
improvement in a Medicare patient's services." Clearly, whatever the
ultimate cost of the program, a patient should receive the best medical
care possible at that cost— this brings us to the issue of efficiency.
Conceivably, the same quality of services—maybe even exactly the
same services—can be obtained at a lower cost. This might result from
HCFA's prices encouraging a more efficient system. For example, imagine
a situation in which the fee schedule currently specifies vastly dif-
ferent unit prices—say $2 and $20—for two different types of labora-
tory services—say "A" and "B"—that are in fact roughly equally
expensive to provide; the vast variation in the fee schedule prices for
the same service in different states (Gurney and Clopton, forthcoming)
hardly argues against such a scenario! Imagine also that Medicare
patients, as a whole, require roughly equal amount of these two types
of services. Now, Always Helpful Hospital (AHH) can perform either
type of service at a unit cost of $10, and has a policy of providing as
much of these services as may be requested of it. Note that if the
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requests for each type of service by AHH have roughly the same proportion
as required by Medicare patients as a whole, AHH still makes a profit;
the profits on type B services slightly more than offsets the losses on
type A services. In contrast, Joe Businessman, Inc., (JBI) can perform
either service at a unit cost of $15, but somehow manages to provide
significantly more type B services than type A, and therefore, although
JBI (the less cost efficient provider) makes a profit, AHH (the more
efficient provider) nets a loss. HCFA could risk the bankruptcy of AHH
or it could let the entire fee schedule inflate some more, or it could
try to align the fee schedule prices more closely with the actual
relative costs. Ideally, the proposed pricing mechanism will tend to
align prices with costs and thereby save HCFA from needing to ferret
out relative cost information on its own.
An additional constraint on our design came from the fact that the
Medicare program serves a heterogeneous population and is consequently
committed to offering as much freedom of choice and to beneficiaries as
possible. This means that beneficiaries, or more precisely the
physicians who order tests on their behalf, should be free to choose a
laboratory which offers "convenient" service provided that it meets
standards of basic quality. In contrast, a HMO may decide to limit the
choices which it offers its enrollees (they may only use certain
hospitals, certain physicians, or certain laboratories) in order to
secure for them a more economical service. Thus, HCFA's preference is
to offer physicians as many choices of laboratories as possible, pro-
vided that service costs do not rise "too much" as choices expand.
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This problem is illustrated by Figure 1 where the bids of various
labs are arrayed in rank order. In Case 1, the bid prices rise very
sharply beyond the third ranked bidder while in Case 2, there is a very
mild price rise between the third and seveth ranked bidders. We wanted
to design the competitive bidding system so that the number of winning
bidders, beyond the number required to assure some minimum level of
convenience, would be a function of the rate at which marginal costs
rose. That is, in Case 1 we wanted to stop selecting winners after the
third lab, while in Case 2 we were willing to select the first six
laboratories. One problem in implementing this design was that we had
no empirical information on what the actual distribution of costs looked
like (hence the need for the demonstration!) and we had no precise
quantification of how much Medicare was willing to pay in order to
increase the number of winning labs.
In developing our competitive bidding mechanism, we also had to
consider how much we wanted to change program rules. One major con-
straint here was that we could not substantially alter (without compen-
sation to beneficiaries) the benefits of the Medicare program. Another
constraint was that we had to limit the number of program changes so
that it would be possible to evaluate their effects. Since the demon-
stration was designed to involve only six sites, we obviously had very
few degrees of freedom to work with.
One important consideration was whether we wanted to alter the
financial incentives faced by Medicare beneficiaries as distinguished
from their physicians. Under Medicare rules in effect after January of
1987, beneficiaries have no out-of-pocket financial obligations
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associated with laboratory tests. (They do have partial payment
obligations for other Medicare services.) While we might have altered
program rules to give beneficiaries an incentive to scrutinize labora-
tory test costs, we chose to leave the rules unaltered so that we
could focus the evaluation on measuring the effects of competitive
bidding on commercial laboratory prices.
Another issue was whether we wished to alter the methods by which
HCFA certifies and inspects laboratories. At present, HCFA has a
program of routine and periodic inspection for commercial laboratories
but it has no inspection program for tests performed by doctors in
their own office. Both the rigor of the laboratory inspection process
and the absence of any inspection of physicians' offices have been
criticized. While our mission was obviously not to review the whole
issue of how and when to inspect laboratories, we had to consider how
competitive bidding might lower a laboratory's reimbursement and
encourage it to skimp on test quality. At the same time, we did not
want to increase the costs of inspection to the point where they might
offset the savings from competitive bidding. Our solution was to adopt
the multiple winning bidder concept originally proposed by CHPS. That
is, we left the current laboratory inspection system unaltered and we
designed the competitive bidding process so that physicians would have
a wide choice of laboratories and thus be able to quickly switch their
business away from any laboratory which appeared to be reducing its
quality.
Even with multiple winners, the most straightforward auction would
pay non-winning laboratories nothing for any Medicare services that
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they provided. This effectively bars a non-winning laboratory from
providing services even if the laboratory just barely missed being a
winner, and therefore runs counter to our philosophy of having
competitive bidding set the price while having as little effect as
possible on who may provide the services. So we wanted to design an
auction in which a laboratory, if it just barely missed being a winner,
could still provide Medicare services so long as it was willing to
provide them at a slightly lower price than a winner would be paid.
More precisely, we wanted that the closer a winner and a loser bid, the
smaller the difference between the rates at which HCFA would pay for
any services that they provided, and that this difference would shrink
to zero if the winning and losing bids were as close together as they
could be. Thus, a laboratory could not in effect be completely barred
from providing Medicare services simply because it made a very small
error in how it bid.
Finally, the competitive mechanism should be as simple as possible
given all the other constraints and objectives as simple as possible
in at least two ways. First, the mechanism should be simple enough so
that it may be clearly defined and easily understood; this limits the
demands that the experiment places on providers' resources, and
minimizes the chances of errors. Second, the mechanism should be simple
in the sense of making it possible for providers to bid very nearly
optimally from the start; no matter how simple the rules of an auction
may be, bidders may require many iterations of the auction to converge
to nearly optimal bids if how each should bid—in other words, the
tradeoffs between the probability of winning and the size of the profit
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conditional on winning—depends heavily and subtly on how others bid.
In short, the experiment should give some hope of demonstrating how the
mechanism might work in the longer term, and should so demonstrate
without imposing an undue burden on the participants in the experiment.
Of course, any cost reductions or service improvements must come
from somewhere. In the longer term, these benefits may come from
increased productivity in providing clinical laboratory services;
indeed we expect the proposed mechanism to result in prices that would
encourage increased productivity. However, in the short term, we have
a pie of fixed size, and any cost savings in Medicare programs must come
at someone's expense. While we might view some changes—for example,
JBI providing equal amounts, possibly zero, of both types of service
in our previous example—as changes for the better, others may
disagree—for example, JBI would probably prefer things as they are in
the example. Thus, at least in the short term, we cannot hope to
satisfy everyone touched by the experimental competitive bidding
mechanism. However, by having stated our model as clearly as possible,
HCFA can ask those who disagree with one or more aspects of the model
to be precise in how they disagree and why; HCFA can then weigh both
sides of the issues when deciding what changes it will consider as
being for the better, and which changes it too would like to avoid.
Solving the Model:
The solution evolved in stages as the model developed and as we
incorporated features to address issues that had been set aside pre-
viously. In fact, many variations on the final solution emerged, each
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with its own properties, and each satisfying the previously stated goals
and constraints in varying degrees. Here we recap the main stages in
the development of the competitive bidding actually proposed to HCFA
—
Mennemeyer et al. (1986) describes a number of the variations considered,
The process started with a simple auction of a single object. In
particular, imagine that the object will be sold to one of a fixed
number of risk neutral bidders. The bidder who offers to pay the most,
or in the case of a contract, asks to be paid the least, for the object
wins it.
The price of the object may be set in many ways; we consider two
possibilities explicitly. The price might be defined as equal to the
winner's bid, just as it would be in a typical sealed bid auction.
Alternatively, the price might be defined as the most competitive
looser 's bid; this "second price" approximates the outcome of common
oral auctions, auctions in which the price stops rising the instant it
exceeds the second most competitive bidder's willingness to pay.
One might think that the "first price" scheme of having the winner
pay the amount of his bid would generate a more favorable price for the
bid-taker than the second price scheme. Not necessarily so. For
example, consider the case of privately known values—the expected
value of the object to each bidder conditional on whatever he knows
about the object and conditional on winning is independent of whatever
any other bidder knows about the object; or more roughly speaking, each
bidder knows his own private value for the object precisely. Then, in
a second price auction, each bidder can do no better than bidding equal
to his expected value for the object. In fact, the winner's bid has no
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effect on the price he pays. The size of his bid does determine when
he wins . To maximize his expected profit, a bidder should bid so as
to win if and only if his expected value for the object exceeds the
price he must pay if he wins. Bidding equal to one's actual expected
value accomplishes this, and does so regardless of the bidding strategies
employed by others.
On the other hand, in first price auctions (more generally than
just in the case of privately known values), a bidder must shade his
bid away from his expected value for the object if he wants a positive
expected profit from the auction. Furthermore, the optimal amount of
shading depends on how others, and on how many others, bid. At
equilibrium—that is , when no one bidder can improve his bidding
strategy given how his competitors are bidding—in the case of private
values, the theory (Vickrey, 1961) predicts that the expected shading
by the winner in a first price auction exactly equals the expected
difference between the winner's bid and price in an otherwise identical
second price auction.
Hyerson (1981) takes this revenue equivalence theory one step
further. Again for the case of privately known values, at equilibrium
in any auction that guarantees a bidder an expected profit of exactly
zero when the bidder has the lowest possible value for the object, the
expected revenue from the auction depends only on how who wins depends
on the bidders' values. For example, the same expected revenue results
so long as the bidder with the highest value—or lowest cost—always
wins if the winner has a value of at least some reservation value r
(and otherwise the bid-taker keeps the object for his own use).
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Thus , tor a sufficiently regular auction of a single object, the
problem of obtaining the best price for the bid-taker becomes on of
optimally setting the reservation price. For a fixed number of bidders,
the optimal reservation price may be quite substantial (Myerson 1981).
However, if the number of bidders may vary
—
perhaps, the more profitable
the auction to the bidders, the more individuals will bid—then
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1987a, 1987b) argues that in the case of an oral
auction with private values, the reservation price should be insignifi-
cant enough so that just as many bidders bid as would have had the bid-
taker set the reservation price equal to his own value (or cost) for
the object.
So far, one might recommend using a second price auction (with
reservation prices equal to the current Medicare fee schedule) to select
a single provider of clinical laboratory services for Medicare patients.
Bidders would have a much easier time determining how to optimally bid
in such an auction than, for example, in a first price auction; this
reduction in bidding costs may result in an improvement in the winning
price that more than offsets any changes in the expected price from
using some other form of auction. However, having only a single
provider violates one of our goals.
So, consider the simultaneous auctioning of k identical objects
with the k highest bidders each winning one object. Again, compare the
first price auction in which each winner pays the amount of his bid, to
the second price auction in which each winner pays an amount equal to
the most competitive losing bid. Vickrey (1962) provides that, under
similar conditions as before, the second price auction generates the
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sarae expected price as the first price auction. In the second price
auction, bidders still have just as simple an optimal bidding strategy
as before. Furthermore, while the first price auction typically results
in a different price for each winner, the second price results in the
same price for all winners; in the case of auctioning k contracts for
clinical laboratory services, this single price could be interpreted as
the fair market price for the particular clinical laboratory.
On the other hand, paying each winner at a rate equal to what the
winner bids creates an incentive for lower bidding winners to subcon-
tract to have their work performed (or, at least billed to HCFA) by a
higher bidding winner. Such an arrangement would most likely benefit
the higher bidding winner
—
presumably the higher cost bidder—at the
expense of the lower bidding winner. In addition, such subcontracting
would tend to drive the average price paid by HCFA up toward the amount
bid by the highest bidding winner.
In short, the theory of auctions and competitive bidding as well
as the effects of subcontracting suggest that HCFA would not necessarily
pay more if it set all the winners' prices equal to the last winning
bid or first losing bid, than if it paid each winner at the price it
actually bid. Furthermore, the uniform price auction may be simpler
for inexperienced bidders to bid in, and the uniform price auction
eliminates the subcontracting benefit that higher cost winners may reap
if laboratories were paid the price that they bid. Thus, at this
point, we pretty much settled on using a second price auction in the
demonstration. However, so far, we still only have a limited number of
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winners—that is, a limited number of providers from which a doctor can
choose.
Now is the time to remember that the auction should focus on setting
the price to be paid for clinical laboratory services, but should try
to avoid setting who provides the services. Therefore, consider the
following "everyone (almost) wins" auction. Each potential provider of
clinical laboratory services bids on the unit cost of providing a
particular type of service. The k lowest bidders win in the sense that,
although they must provide any amount of services requested of then,
they will be paid at a rate equal to the k+1 st (the most competitive
other) bid. On the other hand, any other bidders may provide services
if they wish (if they can find the demand), but will only be paid some
lower price—for example the k th bid discounted by the percentage by
which their bid exceeded the k th bid). We would still expect for
bidders to find it relatively easy to decide how to bid in such an
auction. However, now a doctor can elect to obtain services from a
provider other than one of the k lowest bidding providers IF that
provider is willing to take the payment offered by this mechanism—an
amount less than he bid, and less than that paid to the lowest bidding
providers—as full payment for the service. (As is currently the
case, the Medicare beneficiary pays nothing.) Therefore, this
mechanism, or some slight variation thereof, meets our basic goals.
However, this mechanism leaves two issues unresolved. For one, how
do we set k? We could set k based on an examination of typical
providers' capacities to provide services and them simply make sure
that the capacity of those providers who must provide any amount of
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services requested of them exceeds the maximum likely amount of Medicare
services to be required. Indeed, such a method might be feasible even
though HCFA may in general have certain difficulties in obtaining
accurate information about individual providers; the necessary capacity
estimates would be much easier to obtain—and their accuracy would be
less critical—then the actual cost data required under the current fee
schedule approach. In addition, it would allow HCFA to set a ceiling
—
say 150 percent of the anticipated service volume divided by k—on the
maximum amount of services that anyone of the k lowest bidders need
provide.
Alternatively, we could have providers bid on both price and on the
ceiling for the maximum amount of a service that they could be required
to provide. An appropriately designed mechansim would encourage
reasonable capacity bids. For example, each of the k lowest bidders
could be paid a premium for each unit of capacity availability they
promised—this is similar to a utility company charging you for the
maximum rate at which you may consume their service (for example, 200
amps, or the amount of water that will enter your house through a one
inch supply pipe) in addition to a unit charge for each unit of service
actually provided. Aside from the premium, we could even have all
providers paid at the same unit rate, the kth lowest price bid, where
we set k to be the smallest number so that the combined capacity bid
by the k lowest bidders exceeds the anticipated volume or services
required. As a slight variation, the premium could be paid only on
that fraction of bid capacity that is actually used in providing
services. However, either version would be harder to bid and harder
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to administer Chan if bidders did not bid on quantity in addition to
price.
Thus, we returned to exogenously setting the number of providers
that would be paid at the most favorable rate, but with a significant
twist. Rather than exogenously setting k, we set a rule for setting
k. In particular, set k as the number of bidders who bid less than
105 percent of the 45 th percentile bid; if these k providers do not
appear to have enough capacity to meet anticipated demand, increase k
as necessary. In fact, this mechanism specifically addresses one of
our goals, the goal of making reasonable tradeoffs between the cost of
the service and the number of providers to be paid at the most favor-
able rates (providers which much provide any amount of service
requested of them). Specifically, such a mechanism has the effect of
increasing a doctor's range of alternatives whenever a number of pro-
viders bid very close to what might have otherwise been the cutoff.
Finally, we needed to address the issue of simultaneously pricing
many different types of services. One approach would be to price them
independently of each other. This solves the problem of how to price
them, but raises the possibility that a doctor could not find any one
provider that would provide the full range of services at the rates to
be paid to that provider for services to Medicare patients.
Alternatively, the mechanism could rank bidders based on some
weighted average of their bids for individual services. Then, the
same k providers would be required to provide all services at the
established rate. However, such a mechanism opens up the possibility
of bid unbalancing as described for the construction industry by Stark
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(1974). Specifically, if a provider knows that he will provide a
higher proportion of service type A, and a lower proportion of service
type B, than given by the weights used to calculate his composite bid,
then the provider can increase the expected price that he would be paid
without changing his composite bid; he need simply reduce his bid for
type B services, while increasing his bid on type A services just
enough to leave the composite bid unchanged. The proposed mechanism,
described in the next section, uses composite bids, but attempts to
limit for any incentives to unbalance bids.
The Proposed Solution
The example of this section essentially defines the competitive
bidding mechanism proposed for the demonstration. Specifically,
imagine that seven labs (A, B, C, etc.) bid on four different types of
tests. Table 1 shows the Bid Specifications consisting of the relative
weight for each test and the target volumes anticipated by HCFA. The
relative weights are used to determine the weighted average price of
each lab. (For simplicity, we use weights that are proportional to
target volumes but this is not essential.)
The target test volumes are used to check the initial selection of
winners to see if their capabilities are sufficient to service the
market with adequate provision for backup capacity and choice of
laboratory.
Table 2 shows the prices and volume capabilities of the laboratories
For example Lab A bids a price of $2.00 for Test 1 and states it is
capable of supplying Medicare with up to 300 tests. The weights from
Table 1 are used to compute the value of the basket of tests submitted
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by each laboratory. The rank order of the market baskets is also
shown. for example, Lab A is the lowest bidder (Rank = 1) with a
market basket of $5.25. Laboratories are initially selected as winners
if their market basket average price falls within 105 percent of the
45th percentile. (This assumes that the market basket also falls below
the market basket which would be computed from the existing maximum
Medicare payment rates. One restriction on the bidding is that it must
yield overall a better set of prices to the government than would the
current method of reimbursement.) Under this criterion Labs A, B, D,
and F are winners. Note that each of these bidders falls below $6.72
which is the initial cutoff point at 105 percent of the 45th percentile.
The next step in the analysis of the bids is for HCFA to determine
if the initial winners have sufficient apparent capacity to meet the
target volume levels. This determination will involve examination of
each laboratory's declared capability followed with verification
inspections to any lab that makes capability declarations that are well
above its historical volume of Medicare tests. Table 3 shows the
cumulative volumes of the winning laboratories. The cumulation begins
with the lowest bidder (Lab A), and proceeds in ascending rank order of
the bids.
Note that in our example HCFA's target volume for Test 4 is
satisfied as soon as Lab B has been selected. However, since the
selection of winners is based upon 105 percent of the 45th percentile,
more than enough capability is obtained for this test. For Tests 1, 2,
and 3, the target is not met until all four winning laboratories have
been selected. In our example, it is not necessary to select any
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laboratories beyond 105 percent of the 45th percentile of prices in
order to meet the target volume. If further selection had been
necessary, Lab C with a market basket price of $6.95 would have been
the first selected.
The reward basket is defined as the average of the highest winning
basket received and the first losing basket. In this example, the
highest winning basket is $6.50; the first losing basket is $6.95; the
reward basket is $6.73 = (($6.50 + $6.95)/2).
Table 4 shows the steps which are involved in computing the prices
which are to be paid to both the winning and losing laboratories. Step
1 inflates the prices of each bidder in proportion to the ratio of that
bidder's market basket to a "reward" market basket. This step assures
that all winners will be paid the same amount in terms of an overall
market basket price. For example, Lab A is the lowest bidder. Each of
the prices that it bid are inflated by the ratio of the reward basket
to its basket ($6. 73/$5. 25) . This process brings its prices up so that
it will be paid on average as much as the highest winning bidder. We
also want to discourage inappropriate subcontracting among laboratories,
To do this, all of the winning prices computed in Step 1 are then
averaged for each test. This is shown in Step 2. Note that this
averaging process inevitably means that some of the higher successful
bidders at this point are going to be paid LESS THAN WHAT THEY BID even
though on average across all tests they are getting at least as much as
they asked for. For example, Lab D bid $5.00 for Test 1. Since D is
the highest bidder, its price is averaged down to $4.82.
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Another reason for averaging the price in Step 2 is that this makes
it more difficult for bidders to engage in unbalanced bidding because
they cannot be sure that the prices which they bid will be exactly what
they are paid. Of course, if the market basket weights are not believed
to be a correct representation of future sales proportions, and if most
bidders have similar ideas about future sales proportions and unbalance
their bids to take advantage of this situation, the averaging process
will be thwarted by the combined strategies of the bidders.
In Step 3, the prices for losing bidders are computed. Here we use
the formula where prices are adjusted downward by the percentage by
which the loser's own basket exceeds the reward basket. For example,
Lab C bid $4.00 for Test 1. While this price is actually lower than
the prices bid for Test 1 by winning Labs D and F, Lab C's overall
basket of prices ($6.95) was higher than the highest winning bidder,
namely Lab D ($6.50). All of C's prices are adjusted downward by
[l-($6.95 - $6.73)/$6.73) = .97] so that the winning price of $4.82 on
Test 1 is reduced to a payment of $4.66 [= $4.82 * .97].
Note also that Lab C's discount is milder than that for the other
losing labs. Lab G, for example, is paid only half of the winning price
because it was almost twice as high as the cuttoff market basket. This
approach means that "near losers" are discounted much less severely
than are losing bidders with comparatively much higher prices. The
purpose of this approach is to create a progressively stronger incentive
for bidders to offer Medicare their most favorable price. However, to
protect inexperienced bidders from strategic errors in bidding, the
discount is limited to being 50 percent of the winning prices.
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Table 1
3id Specifications
Target
Weight Voluie
Test 1 0.20 2000
Test 2 0.30 3000
Test 3 0.35 3500
Test 4 0.15 1500
Table 2
Prices and Volume Capabilities of the Labs
Lab Lab A Lab B Lab C Lab D Lab E Lab F Lab G
price
volume
Test 1 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00
300 700 1000 600 200
Test 2 4.00 2.00 6.00 4.00 7.00
400 700 2000 1000 300
Test 3 10.00 14.00 12.00 11.00 13.00
400 900 3000 1300 350
Test 4 1.00 2.00 1.00 3.00 2.00
500 900 300 400 150
Basket
Total 5.25 6.40 6.95 6.50 8.15
Rank 1 2.5 5 4 6
Status Win Win Lose Win Lose
45th percentile plus 5% = 6.72
Highest Winning 3asket = 6.50
First Losing Basket = 6.95
Reward Basket = 6.73 = (6.50 + 6.95)/2
8.00 7.00
600 200
4.00 9.00
1000 100
9.00 23.00
1000 100
3.00 5.00
300 200
6.40 12.90
2.5 7
Win Lose
Table 3
Cumulative Volume Capabilities Offered by Winners
Lab A Lab B Lab F Lab D Target
Test 1 300 1000 1600 2200 2000
Test 2 400 1100 2100 3100 3000
Test 3 400 1300 2300 3600 3500
Test 4 600 1500 2300 2700 1500
Rank 1 2 3 4
Table 4
Computation of Prices Paid to Bidders
Step 1 Adjust Winners by Market Basket Ratio
Lab A Lab 3 Lab C Lab D Lab E Lab F
Step 2 Average the Adjusted Winning Prices
Lab A Lab B Lab C Lab D Lab E Lab F
Step 3 Compute Discount Payments to Losing Bidders
Lab A Lab B Lab C Lab D Lab E Lab F
Lab
Test 1 2.56 3.15 NA 5.17 NA 8.41 NA
Test 2 5.12 2.10 NA 4.14 NA 4.20 NA
Test 3 12.81 14.71 NA 11.38 NA 9.46 NA
Test 4 1.28 2.10 NA 3.10 NA 3.15 NA
Basket 6.73 6.73 NA 6.73 NA 6.73 NA
Lab G
Test 1 4.82 4.82 NA 4.82 NA 4.82 NA
Test 2 3.89 3.89 NA 3.89 NA 3.89 NA
Test 3 12.09 12.09 NA 12.09 MA 12.09 NA
Test 4 2.41 2.41 NA 2.41 NA 2.41
Basket 6.73 6.73 NA 6.73 NA 6.73 NA
Lab
Test 1 NA NA 4.66 NA 3.80 NA 2.41
Test 2 NA NA 3.76 NA 3.07 NA 1.95
Test 3 NA NA 11.69 NA 9.53 NA 6.04
Test 4 NA NA 2.33 NA 1.90 NA 1.20
Basket NA NA
.
6.50 NA 5.30 NA 3.36
Summary Payments to all Parties
Test 1 4.82 4.82 4.66 4.82 3.30 4.82 2.41
Test 2 3.89 3.89 3.76 3.89 3.07 3.39 1.95
Test 3 12.09 12.09 11.69 12.09 9.53 12.09 6.04
Test 4 2.41 2.41 2.33 2.41 1.90 2.41 1.20
3asket 6.73 6.73 6.50 6.73 5.30 6.73 3.36
NA = Not Applicable
Price
Bid
Figure 1
Kanic oi
Bidder
Case 1
Price
Bid
T >
Rank of
Bidder
Case 2


